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Abstract
At a mixed Nash equilibrium, the payoff of a player does not depend on her
own action, as long as her opponent sticks to his. In a periodic strategy, a concept
developed in a previous paper [3], in contrast, the own payoff does not depend on
the opponent’s action. Here, we generalize this to multi-player simultaneous per-
fect information strategic form games. We show that also in this class of games,
there always exists at least one periodic strategy, and we investigate the mathe-
matical properties of such periodic strategies. In addition, we demonstrate that
periodic strategies may exist in games with incomplete information; we shall fo-
cus on Bayesian games. Moreover we discuss the differences between the periodic
strategies formalism and cooperative game theory. In fact, the periodic strategies
are obtained in a purely non-cooperative way, and periodic strategies are as coop-
erative as the Nash equilibria are. Finally, we incorporate the periodic strategies in
an epistemic game theory framework, and discuss several features of this approach.
1 Introduction
John Nash [1] showed that every strategic form game possesses at least one Nash
equilibrium (for an alternative proof, that avoids the use of Brouwer’s fixed point
theorem and only needs simple topological facts about bifurcations, see [2]). Here, it is
assumed that players act rationally in the sense that they try to maximize their payoffs,
and this rationality of all players is common knowledge, as are the possible actions and
payoffs of each player. The Nash equilibrium then is consistent in the sense that when
everybody plays it, no single player could gain an advantage from a unilateral deviation.
Such a Nash equilibrium can be pure, that is, each player plays some definite strategy,
or mixed, where some players choose among their actions with certain probabilities. For
instance, the matching pennies game has only one Nash equilibrium, and this is mixed,
as each player plays either strategy randomly with probability 1/2. Such a mixed Nash
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equilibrium has a curious property. To see this, for simplicity, we consider a game with
two players i = A,B who have two possible actions 1, 2 each. When A and B play
actions α and β with respective probabilities pα and qβ (with p1 + p2 = 1 = q1 + q2),
then the (expected) utility of A is (in obvious notation)
UA =
∑
α,β
UA(α, β)pαqβ. (1)
When now A wants to maximize her payoff, she adjusts her probabilities p1 and applies
calculus to get as a first order necessary condition at a mixed value 0 < p1 < 1
0 =
∑
β
UA(1, β)qβ −
∑
β
UA(2, β)qβ . (2)
This then is a condition about the probabilities qβ of her opponent which is independent
of her own probabilities pα. That is, when the opponent plays according to those values,
it is irrelevant for A what she plays. She will always get the same payoff. Thus, at
a mixed Nash equilibrium, when every player has a mixed strategy, no single player
can change her outcome by changing her strategy, as long as all others stick to their
probabilities.
Of course, this is well known. The phenomenon is simply a consequence of the fact that
the utility U depends linearly on the probabilities of the individual players. Therefore,
taking the derivative w.r.t. them makes the resulting condition independent of them.
In [3], we have investigated what happens when A seeks a critical point of (1) not with
respect to her own probability p!, but with respect to the opponent probability q!. We
then get the condition
0 =
∑
α
UA(α, 1)pα −
∑
α
UA(α, 2)pα. (3)
This is now independent of the opponent’s probabilities qβ. That is, when A plays
according to (3), her payoff is unaffected by the choice of strategy of her opponent.
Let us consider a simple example where the payoff table is given by,
1 2
1 2,1 0,0
2 0,0 1,1
with A being the row player and B the column player. (2) for A yields q1 = 1/3, q2 =
2/3, and the analogous computation for B gives p1 = 1/2 = p2. The expected payoffs
for at this mixed Nash equilibrium are
UA = 2
1
2
1
3
+ 1
1
2
2
3
=
2
3
, UB = 1
1
2
1
3
+ 1
1
2
2
3
=
1
2
. (4)
In contrast, (3), when applied for both players, yields p1 =
1
3 , q1 =
1
2 . The expected
utilities remain the same. As investigated in [3], the latter property does not always
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hold, that is, the payoffs at a mixed Nash and at an equilibrium computed according to
(3) need not always be the same, and depending on the game, either of them could be
larger than the other. But an equilibrium according to (3), called periodic for reasons
to be discussed in a moment, exists in the same generality as a mixed Nash equilibrium
and to show this is the main purpose of this paper.
In order to explore the consistency of such an equilibrium, it is useful to recall the
concept of rationalizability of Bernheim [37] and Pearce [38]. Here, a sequence of
alternating strategy choices of A and B is called rationalizable if each of them is a best
response to the previous strategy of the opponent. A Nash equilibrium is rationalizable,
but in general, there are other sequences of rationalizability strategies. For instance, in
the matching pennies game, there is a sequence where each player alternates between
her/his two options. In such a sequence, each strategy periodically repeats itself. A
similar phenomenon exists also for our type of equilibrium, and this is the reason why
it was called periodic. The interpretation is somewhat curious, however. Since a player
can of course not directly choose the opponent’s probabilities to maximize her payoff,
which was the assumption underlying (3), the logic has to become somewhat different.
While A cannot choose q1, her opponent can choose his q1 so as to maximize A’s payoff,
and conversely, A could then choose her p1 to maximize B’s payoff. Again, this can
be done as an iterative response as in the rationalizability paradigm, and when both
players act that way, this is perfectly self-consistent. That is, when everybody believes
that everybody else operates in that way and acts accordingly, a periodic cycle exists
that confirms everybody’s belief.
In this paper, we first generalize the theorems related to periodic strategies to simul-
taneous multi-player perfect information strategic form games. Several examples will
illustrate the new features brought by the presence of three or more players.
Periodic strategies for non-trivial perfect information simultaneous strategic form games
are related (or in some cases are identical) to all the existing rationalizable strategies
[4–20], as demonstrated in [3]. We shall then turn to the question whether such periodic
strategies also exist in strategic form games with incomplete information. We shall
mainly focus on Bayesian games [6,21–31], in which case the presence of rationalizable
strategies (ex ante and interim) suggests that periodic strategies should also exist in
this type of games. In fact, games where the players are uncertain about the setting
and only know that certain scenarios occur with certain probabilities can sometimes be
modelled as a games with an additional nature player who chooses among the scenarios
with those probabilities. This will also be useful for our reasoning. Also with regard
to incomplete information and cooperative game theory, in Ref. [32] an interesting
approach was used in order to study reentrant phase transitions and defensive alliances
in social dilemmas with informed strategies. Furthermore a review on co-evolutionary
games was provided in Ref. [33].
One of the most important features of the periodic strategy algorithm is that periodic
strategies do apply to non-cooperative game theory [34, 35]. As explained, however,
by construction, the periodic strategies are based on maximizing the payoffs of a game
for a player by using the probability distribution of the opponents. We should point
out, however, that this is different from the setting of cooperative game theory, which
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is about coalitions and distributions of payoffs inside them. In contrast, the procedure
for obtaining the periodic strategies involves maximization of a player’s own utility
function, without any cooperation with the opponent, or any apparent agreement.
Finally, we shall attempt to incorporate the periodicity concept into an epistemic game
theory [24,36] theoretical framework.
The outline of the paper is as follows: In section 2, we generalize the periodic solution
concept to multi-player finite, perfect information simultaneous strategic form games.
In section 3 we study the periodic solution concept for games with incomplete infor-
mation, quantified in terms of Bayesian games. The non-cooperativity argument on
which periodicity is based is discussed in section 4, while in section 5, we incorporate
the periodicity concept in a very simple epistemic game theory framework by connect-
ing types to the periodicity number, without getting into much details however. The
conclusions along with future perspectives of the periodicity concept follow at the end
of the paper.
2 Generalization of the Periodicity Concept to Multi-player
Games – The Perfect Information Case
In this section we generalize the concept of periodicity to multi-player strategic form
games with perfect information. We start with a concrete example. Consider a three
player game with
• The set of players: I = A,B,C
• Their strategy spaces M(A), M(B), M(C) and the total strategy space G¯ =
M(A)×M(B)×M(C)
• The payoff functions Ui(G¯) : G¯→ ℜ, i = A,B,C
We define six continuous maps between the strategy spaces M(i) and M(j),
ϕij :M(i)→M(j) (5)
We usually write ϕijϕkm for ϕij ◦ ϕkm. The maps ϕij and ϕji, act in such a way that
when we start with an action xk of player i, the following inequality holds:
Ui(xk, ϕij(xk), ϕim(xk)) > Ui(xk, x, y) ∀ (x, y) ∈ M(j) ∪M(m)\{ϕij(xk), ϕim(xk)}
(6)
In the example of GAME 1 in Fig. 1, each player has two actions available.
In Fig. 2 we can see the periodicity chains for the action a1 of player A, recalling the
periodicity concept we gave in the 2-player game case in Ref. [3]. Let us give a verbal
description of the periodicity diagram. The letters ABC on the arrows indicate the
player whose action is considered.
Player A will play a1 if player B plays b2 and player C plays c2 simultaneously. In the
map notation, this becomes ϕAB(a1), ϕAC(a1), as indicated in the figure. By following
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Game1
a1
a2
b1 b2
34,25,41 32,31,36
32,30,38 33,31,36
a1
a2
b1 b2
35,29,37 38,32,40
35,38,27 36,39,25
c1 c2
Figure 1: A 3-Player Game payoff matrix. The game is a simultaneous action game
of three players A, B and C. The actions of the players A, B and C are denoted as
(a1, a2), (b1, b2) and (c1, c2) respectively.
the B arrow, B will play b2 if player A plays a2 and player C plays c2. Following C
in node ”1”, C would play c2 if player B plays b2 and A plays a1 (we have reached a
periodic cycle at this point but we continue in order to show the new structures). Back
in node 2, following the C arrow, C will play c2 if B plays b2 and A plays a1. Back in
node 2 following the arrow A, A will play a2 if B plays b2 and C plays c2. Accordingly,
in node 3, following arrow B, B will play b2 if A plays a2 and C plays c2 (we have
reached a set stable cycle of a2 as we will see) and so on. Back at node 3, following
3 player game a1
a1 (b2,c )2
(a2,c )2
(B2,a )1
B
C
( (a ), (a ))f fAB 1 AC 1
( (a ), (a ))f f f fBA AB 1 BC AB 1
( (a ), (a ))f f f fCB AC 1 CA AC 1
(a2,c )2
(b2,c )2
B
A
(b2,a )1
(b2,c )2
C
A
( (a ), (a ))f f f f f fCB BC AB 1 CB BC AB 1
( (a ), (a ))f f f f f fAB BA AB 1 AC BA AB 1
( (a ), (a ))f f f f f fBA CB AC 1 BC CB AC 1
( (a ), (a ))f f f f f fAB CA AC 1 AC CA AC 1
f f f f
lm lmjk jk= o
1
2
3
Figure 2: The periodicity of the strategy a1 for the 3-player game of Fig. 1. In the
figure it is shown how the periodicity concept is realized for the strategy a1 of player
A in detail. The graph returns to the original strategy a1.
A, A will play a1, if B plays b2 and C plays c2 and so on. Thus, we have the periodic
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cycles
ϕCAϕAC(a1) = a1 (7)
ϕCAϕBCϕAB(a1) = a1
The most striking new feature of the multi-player game case is the fact that in the
periodicity algorithm, the utility functions appear in a rather different order as we
shall see. Let us take the first type, ϕCAϕAC(a1) = a1. The periodic algorithm in
terms of the utility functions is
UA(a1, ϕAB(a1), ϕAC (a1)) > UA(a1, x, y) ∀ (x, y) ∈ M(B) ∪M(C)\{ϕAB(a1), ϕAC (a1)}
(8)
UC(ϕAC(a1), ϕCAϕAC(a1), ϕCBϕAC(a1)) > UC(ϕAC(a1), x, y) ∀ (x, y)
∈ M(A) ∪M(B)\{ϕCAϕAC(a1), ϕCBϕAC(a1)}
UA(ϕCAϕAC(a1), ϕABϕCAϕAC(a1), ϕACϕCAϕAC(a1)) > UA(ϕCAϕAC(a1), x, y)
∀ (x, y) ∈ M(C) ∪M(B)\{ϕABϕCAϕAC(a1), ϕACϕCAϕAC(a1)}
For the other type, ϕCAϕBCϕAB(a1) = a1, the periodic algorithm becomes
UA(a1, ϕAB(a1), ϕAC (a1)) > UA(a1, x, y) ∀ (x, y) ∈ M(B) ∪M(C)\{ϕAB(a1), ϕAC (a1)}
(9)
UB(ϕAB(a1), ϕBAϕAB(a1), ϕBCϕAB(a1)) > UC(ϕAB(a1), x, y) ∀ (x, y)
∈ M(A) ∪M(B)\{ϕBAϕAB(a1), ϕBCϕAB(a1)}
UC(ϕBCϕAB(a1), ϕCAϕBCϕAB(a1), ϕCBϕBCϕAB(a1)) > UC(ϕBCϕAB(a1), x, y)
∀ (x, y) ∈ M(C) ∪M(B)\{ϕCAϕBCϕAB(a1), ϕCBϕBCϕAB(a1)}
In terms of utility functions, this looks like
UA
P
−→ UC
P
−→ UA (10)
UA
P
−→ UC
P
−→ UA
P
−→ UC
P
−→ UA
UA
P
−→ UB
P
−→ UB
P
−→ UB
UA
P
−→ UB
P
−→ UA
P
−→ UC
UA
P
−→ UC
P
−→ UB
P
−→ UC
If we include all the periodic points we found in the graph, we have the following new
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types of periodicity (some of which belong to set stable cycles):
ϕCAϕAC(a1) = a1 (11)
ϕBCϕAB(a1) = a1
ϕBCϕCBϕAC(a1) = a1
ϕACϕBAϕAB(a1) = a1
ϕBCϕABϕCAϕAC(a1) = a1
ϕBCϕCBϕAC(a1) = a1
The periodicity corresponding to the a2 action is shown in Fig. 3. In general, there can
Periodicityof a2 strategy
3 player game a2
a2 (b2,c )2
(a2,c )2
(a1,b )2
(b2,a )1
(b2,c )2
(a1,b )2
(a2,c )2
A
B
C
B
C
(b2,c )2
(a2,c )2
A
C
B
UA UB UA
UA UC UA UB
UA UC UB
Figure 3: Periodicity of strategy a2 for the 3-player game of Fig. 1.
be various types of periodicity, with their number, type and form not directly depending
on the numbers of players and actions. As the number of players increases, depending
on the payoffs, the complexity of the periodic strategies significantly increases. But as
will become obvious, the complexity of the algorithm depends strongly on the payoffs.
Now we generalize this type of games and we proceed to a 4-player game with each
player having again two available actions, as shown in Fig. 5. In Fig. 4 and 6, we see
the periodic structure for the actions a1 and a2, resp. We now look at the periodic
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Periodicityof a1
(c2,d ,b )2 2 (a1,b ,c )2 1
(a2,b ,d )1 2
(b1,a ,d )2 2
(a1,b ,c )2 1
(a2,c ,d )2 2
(b1,a ,d )2 2
C
D
1
2
3
4
5
a1
(a2,b ,c )1 2
(c2,b ,d )2 2
(a2,c ,d )2 1
B
C
D
B
(c2,b ,d )2 2
(a2,c ,d )2 1
(a1,b ,c )2 1
(a1,b ,c )2 1
(a2,c ,d )2 2
(b1,a ,d )2 2
C
D
B
C
A
D
A
D
B
4 player a1
( )a ,b ,c1 2 1
(a1,b ,c )2 1
D
D
Figure 4: Periodicity of strategy a1 for the 4-player game of Fig. 5.
strategies for a1 in Fig. 4. These are the following:
ϕDAϕAD(a1) = a1 (12)
ϕDAϕCDϕAC(a1)(a1) = a1
ϕDAϕADϕCA(a1)ϕAC(a1) = a1
ϕDAϕBDϕAB(a1)ϕBA(a1)ϕAB(a1) = a1
ϕDAϕADϕBAϕAB(a1) = a1
In terms of utility functions, this looks as follows, with Type j referring to line j in
(12).
Type 1
UA(a1, ϕAD(a1), ϕAC(a1), ϕAB(a1)) > UA(a1, x, y, z) (13)
∀ (x, y, z) ∈ M(B) ∪M(C) ∪M(D)\{, ϕAD(a1), ϕAC(a1), ϕAB(a1)}
UD(ϕAD(a1), ϕDAϕAD(a1), ϕDCϕAD(a1), ϕDBϕAD(a1)) > UD(ϕAD(a1), x, y, z)
(14)
∀ (x, y, z) ∈ M(A) ∪M(B) ∪M(C)\{ϕBAϕAB(a1), ϕBCϕAB(a1)}
Type 2
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Game2
4-Player game
a1
a2
b1 b2
34,25,41,20 32,31,36,15
32,30,38,4 33,31,36,25
a1
a2
b1 b2
35,29,37,45 38,32,40,41
35,38,27,46 35,42,25,40
a1
a2
b1 b2
36,25,40,41 12,11,16,150
12,35,31,43 3,3,4,26
a1
a2
b1 b2
4,2,7,5 8,2,0,1
5,8,71,6 36,44,28,49
c1 c2
c1 c2
c
c
d1
d2
D
Figure 5: A 4-player game payoff matrix. The game is a simultaneous action game of
four players A, B, C and D.
UA(a1, ϕAC(a1), ϕAD(a1), ϕAB(a1)) > UA(a1, x, y, z) (15)
∀ (x, y, z) ∈ M(B) ∪M(C) ∪M(D)\{, ϕAD(a1), ϕAC(a1), ϕAB(a1)}
UC(ϕAC(a1), ϕCAϕAC(a1), ϕCBϕAC(a1), ϕCDϕAC(a1)) > UC(ϕAC(a1), x, y, z) ∀ (x, y, z)
∈ M(A) ∪M(B) ∪M(D)\{, ϕCAϕAC(a1), ϕCBϕAC(a1), ϕCDϕAC(a1)}
UD(ϕCDϕAC(a1), ϕDAϕCDϕAC(a1), ϕDBϕCDϕAC(a1), ϕDCϕCDϕAC(a1)) >
UC(ϕCDϕAC(a1), x, y, z)
∀ (x, y, z) ∈ M(C) ∪M(B) ∪M(A)\{ϕDAϕCDϕAC(a1), ϕDBϕCDϕAC(a1), ϕDCϕCDϕAC(a1)}
Type 3
9
UA(a1, ϕAC(a1), ϕAD(a1), ϕAB(a1)) > UA(a1, x, y, z) (16)
∀(x, y, z)
∈ M(B) ∪M(C) ∪M(D)\{, ϕAD(a1), ϕAC(a1), ϕAB(a1)}
UC(ϕAC(a1), ϕCAϕAC(a1), ϕCBϕAC(a1), ϕCDϕAC(a1)) > UC(ϕAC(a1), x, y, z) ∀(x, y, z)
∈ M(A) ∪M(B) ∪M(D)\{ϕCAϕAC(a1), ϕCBϕAC(a1), ϕCDϕAC(a1)}
UA(ϕCAϕAC(a1), ϕACϕCAϕAC(a1), ϕABϕCAϕAC(a1), ϕADϕCAϕAC(a1)) >
UA(ϕCAϕAC(a1), x, y, z)
∀(x, y, z)
∈ M(C) ∪M(B) ∪M(D)\{ϕDAϕCDϕAC(a1), ϕDBϕCDϕAC(a1), ϕDCϕCDϕAC(a1)}
UD(ϕADϕCAϕAC(a1), ϕDAϕADϕCAϕAC(a1), ϕDAϕADϕCAϕAC(a1), ϕDBϕADϕCAϕAC(a1)) >
UD(ϕADϕCAϕAC(a1), x, y, z)
∀(x, y, z)
∈ M(C) ∪M(B) ∪M(A)\{ϕDAϕADϕCAϕAC(a1), ϕDAϕADϕCAϕAC(a1), ϕDBϕADϕCAϕAC(a1)}
Type 4
10
UA(a1, ϕAC(a1), ϕAD(a1), ϕAB(a1)) > UA(a1, x, y, z) (17)
∀(x, y, z)
∈ M(B) ∪M(C) ∪M(D)\{, ϕAD(a1), ϕAC(a1), ϕAB(a1)}
UB(ϕAB(a1), ϕBAϕAB(a1), ϕBCϕAB(a1), ϕBDϕAB(a1)) > UB(ϕAB(a1), x, y, z)
∀(x, y, z)
∈ M(A) ∪M(C) ∪M(D)\{ϕBAϕAB(a1), ϕBCϕAB(a1), ϕBDϕAB(a1)}
UA(ϕBAϕAB(a1), ϕACϕBAϕAB(a1), ϕABϕBAϕAB(a1), ϕADϕBAϕAB(a1)) >
UA(ϕBAϕAB(a1), x, y, z) ∀(x, y, z)
∈ M(C) ∪M(B) ∪M(D)\{ϕACϕBAϕAB(a1), ϕABϕBAϕAB(a1), ϕADϕBAϕAB(a1)}
UC(ϕACϕBAϕAB(a1), ϕCAϕACϕBAϕAB(a1), ϕCDϕACϕBAϕAB(a1),
ϕCBϕACϕBAϕAB(a1), ϕDCϕADϕCAϕAC(a1)) > UC(ϕADϕCAϕAC(a1), x, y, z)
∀(x, y, z)
∈ M(D)
∪M(B) ∪M(A)\{ϕDAϕADϕCAϕAC(a1), ϕDAϕADϕCAϕAC(a1),
ϕDBϕADϕCAϕAC(a1), ϕDCϕADϕCAϕAC(a1)}
UD(ϕCDϕACϕBAϕAB(a1), ϕDAϕCDϕACϕBAϕAB(a1),
ϕDBϕCDϕACϕBAϕAB(a1), ϕDBϕCDϕACϕBAϕAB(a1), ϕDCϕCDϕACϕBAϕAB(a1)) >
UD(ϕCDϕACϕBAϕAB(a1), x, y, z) ∀(x, y, z)
∈ M(C) ∪M(B) ∪M(A)\{ϕDAϕCDϕACϕBAϕAB(a1),
ϕDBϕCDϕACϕBAϕAB(a1), ϕDBϕCDϕACϕBAϕAB(a1), ϕDCϕCDϕACϕBAϕAB(a1)}
Player A would play a1 if players D, B and C play d2, b2 and c2. Following arrow
C, player C would play c2 if players A, B and D play simultaneously a2, b1 and d2.
Following arrow B at node 2, player B would play b1 if players A, C and D play a2, c2
and d1. Following arrow A at node 2, player A would play a2 if players B, C and D
play b2, c2 and d2. Following arrow D at node 4, player D would play d2 if players A,
B and C play a1, b2 and c1.
We have reached the first periodic point. Following arrow b at node 4, player b would
play b2 if players A, C and D play a2, c2 and d2. Following arrow C at node 4, player C
would play c2 if players A, B and D play a2, b1 and d2. Going back to node 2, following
arrow D, player D would play d2 if players A, B and C play a1, b2 and c1. Going back
to node 1, following arrow B at node 1, player B would play b2 if players A, C and
D play a2, c2 and d1. Following arrow A at node 4, player A would play a2 if players
B, C and D play b2, c2 and d2. Following arrow B at node 5, player B would play b2
if players A, C and D play a2, c2 and d2. Player D would then play d2, if players A,
B and C play a1, b2 and c1. Following arrow D at node 5, player D would play d2 if
players A, B and C play a1, b2 and c1. Following arrow C at node 5, player C would
play c2 if players A, B and D play a2, b1 and d2. Finally, D would play d2 if players if
players A B and C play a1, b2 and c1.
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Periodicityof a2
4 player a2
a2 (b2,c ,d )2 2 (a2,b ,d )1 2
(a2,c ,d )2 2
(a1,b ,c )2 1 (a2,c ,d )2 2
(b2,c ,a )2 1
(c2,d ,b )2 2
(a1,b ,c )2 1
(a2,c ,d )2 2
(a2,b ,d )1 2 etc.
A
B
C
D
C
D
1
2
3 4
5
B
Figure 6: Periodicity of strategy a1 for the 4-player game of Fig. 5.
2.1 The Periodicity Concept for Simultaneous Perfect Information
Multi-Player Games
After these examples, we shall now generalize the concept of periodicity to general
multi-player simultaneous perfect information strategic form games. Consider a finite
player, finite action, perfect information, simultaneous, strategic form game, with
• The set I = 1, . . . , N of players
• Their strategy spacesM(i), . . . and the total strategy space G¯ =M(1)×...M(N)
• Their payoff functions Ui(G¯) : G¯→ ℜ.
We define 2N continuous maps between the strategy spaces M(i) and M(j),
ϕij :M(i)→M(j) (18)
The maps act in such a way that, when starting with an action xi of player i, the
following inequalities hold:
Ui(xi, ϕij(xi), ϕik(xi), ..., ϕil(xi)) > Ui(xi, y1, y2, ..., yl) (19)
∀ (y1, y2, ..., yl) ∈ M(j) ∪M(k)∪, ...,M(l)\{ϕij (xi), ϕik(xi), ..., ϕil(xi)}
Uk(ϕik(xi), ϕkiϕik(xi), ϕkjϕik(xi), ..., ϕklϕik(xi)) > Uk(ϕik(xi), y1, y2, ..., yl)
∀ (y1, y2, ..., yl) ∈ M(j) ∪M(k)∪, ...,M(l)\{ϕkiϕik(xi), ϕkjϕik(xi), ..., ϕklϕik(xi)}
...
n− step
Um(ϕmm1ϕmm1ϕm1m2 ◦ ... ◦ ϕik(xi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
n times
... ϕmk1 ◦ ... ◦ ϕik(xi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
n+1 times
) >
Uk(ϕmm1ϕmm1ϕm1m2 ◦ ... ◦ ϕik(xi), y1, y2, ..., yl)
∀ (y1, y2, ..., yl) ∈ M(j) ∪M(k)∪, ...,M(l)\{... ϕmk1 ◦ ... ◦ ϕik(xi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
n+1 times
}
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We call the action xi periodic if at some step of the periodicity algorithm [3], we have
xi = ϕmi ◦ ... ◦ ϕik(xi) (20)
Let us explain the meaning of each step of the algorithm. Start with the first step, when
i plays xi, his payoff is maximized when his opponents play a combination of actions
(simultaneously), namely the actions (ϕi1(xi), ϕi2(xi), ..., ϕiN (xi)). This procedure is
repeated at every step.
Definition 1 (Periodicity). In an N -player simultaneous move strategic form game
with finite actions, we define periodic strategies for player A to be the subset P(A) of
his available strategies M(A) for which there exists an operator Q: M(A) → M(A),
with Q = ϕij(xi), ϕik(xi), ..., ϕil(xi) for which Qxi = xi such that the inequalities of
relation (19) are fulfilled at each step.
Periodic strategies are structures inherent to every non-trivial finite action N -player
strategic form game.
Theorem 1. Every finite action simultaneous N -player strategic form game contains
at least one periodic action.
Proof. The proof of the theorem is very easy, since the inequalities (19) hold. Let us
consider player i and start from an action x∗ which is assumed to be non-periodic.
If we apply the maps ϕ(ij) to x∗, so that the inequalities (19) are satisfied at every
step, then, since the game contains a finite number n of actions, there will be an
action xa for which there exists an operator constructed from a finite number of maps
Q = ϕij(xi), ϕik(xi), ..., ϕil(xi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
finite times
, so that Qxa = xa. If the above is not true for any
other action apart from xa, then since the game contains a finite number of actions,
this would imply that xa is periodic. So every finite action game contains at least one
periodic action.
A more detailed proof goes as follows. Suppose we start with the non-periodic action
xi of player i. Then
Ui(xi, ϕij(xi), ϕik(xi), ..., ϕil(xi)) > Ui(xi, y1, y2, ..., yl)... (21)
The algorithm will continue for some player k,
Uk(ϕik(xi), ϕkiϕik(xi), ϕkjϕik(xi), ..., ϕklϕik(xi)) > Uk(ϕik(xi), y1, y2, ..., yl)..... (22)
After this step, the algorithm will continue for some of the actions ϕkiϕik ◦ ... ◦ϕklϕik,
if none of the actions is repeated. Suppose the algorithm continues and it is the turn
of player m, with
Um(ϕkm(xi)ϕik(xi), ϕmkϕkmϕik(xi), ..., ϕmlϕkmϕik(xi)) > Um(ϕkm(xi)ϕik(xi), y1, y2, ..., yl).....
(23)
Since this is deterministic and there are only finitely many players and actions, it
eventually has to become periodic.
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The above reasoning reveals another property of the set of periodic actions in finite
multi-player simultaneous strategic form games. Recall the definition of set stable
strategies from Bernheim [37]. We modify this definition of set stability as follows:
Definition 2 (Set Stability). Let Q be an automorphism Q : M(A) → M(A). In
addition, let A ⊆ A ∪ B ⊆ M(A), with A ∩ B = ∅. The set A is set stable under the
action of the map Q if, for any initial x0 ∈ A∪B and any sequence xk formed by taking
xk+1 ∈ Q(xk), there exists xK ∈ A∪B such that d(xK , x
1) < ǫ, with x1 ∈ A. For finite
sets, this implies that any sequence formed by applying the operator Q produces an xk
for any initial x0, with xk belonging to the set stable set A.
Theorem 2. Let P(i) denote the set of periodic strategies for player i. The set P(i)
is set stable, under the action of the maps ϕij .
Thus, the periodicity diagram of any non-periodic action x0 results in the periodicity
cycle of some action xK .
Proof. The proof of this theorem is contained in the proof of Theorem 1.
2.2 New Features; Remarks
There is one difference between the 2- and the multi-player periodicity. In the two-
player case, the utility functions chain is
UA
P
−→ UB
P
−→ UA
P
−→ UB .... (24)
and the periodicity occurs for UA, if we start with a periodic action of player A. In the
multi-player case, although we may start with an action xi of player i and the utility
Ui, the periodicity might occur at the utility function of another player, say Um. Let
us further explain this version of periodicity. At the end of the algorithm, player m
will play one of his actions, when his opponents play some actions, one of which is
xi, corresponding to player i. However, this does not exclude the fact that we might
return to the utility function of player i again. One example of this kind is Type 2
periodicity of player C, for the three player game we studied previously in this section,
or the periodicity of a2 corresponding to the same game. Having studied the perfect
information case, we now generalize our framework to include non-perfect information
games.
3 Non Perfect Information Games – Bayesian Games
In this section we address the issue of periodicity in the case of finite games with incom-
plete information. Our analysis on incomplete information games is based mainly on
references [6,21–31] and references therein. In Bayesian strategic form games and more
generally in strategic form games with incomplete information, we can always associate
some relaated complete information strategic form games to the game in question. The
corresponding strategic form games are called ex-ante and interim strategic form games.
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Exploiting these two, we will define and study the ex-ante and interim rationalizable
strategies and through these, the periodicity in the case of non-perfect information
games. With respect to the latter, the interim rationalizability has two versions, the
interim independent and interim correlated rationalizability. Both can be found by
constructing the interim independent and interim correlated strategic form game from
the initial Bayesian game. Since the Bayesian games can be represented in terms of
strategic form games, all the periodicity concepts that we developed in the 2-player [3]
and multi-player cases hold true. For simplicity, we shall only present the case with two
players and two actions for each player. The findings can be easily be generalized to
the multi-player case. The interim independent strategic form game with the Bayesian
game having initially two players corresponds to a three player game. Let us start with
the ex-ante game. A Bayesian game is a list (N,A,Θ, T, u, p), with
• N , the number of players
• A = (Ai)i∈N , the set of action profiles with generic member a = (ai)i∈N
• Θ, the set of all possible parameters θi (in our case usually two different matrices
for one of the two players)
• T = (Ti)i∈N the set of types with generic member t = (ti)i∈N
• ui : Θ×A→ R, the payoff function of player i
• pi = pi(· | ti) ∈ ∆(Θ× T−i) is the belief of the type ti about θ, t−i
Each player i knows his own type ti but does not necessarily know θ, or the other
players’ types, about which he has a belief pi(· | ti). The game is defined in terms of
players interim beliefs pi(· | ti), which they obtain after they observe their own type,
but before taking their action. The game can also be defined by ex-ante beliefs pi ∈
∆(Θ×T ) for some belief pi. The game has a common prior, if there exists π ∈ ∆(Θ×T )
such that:
pi(· | ti) = π(· | ti), ∀ ti ∈ Ti, ∀ i ∈ N (25)
In that case, the game is denoted by (N,A,Θ, u, π). When modelling incomplete in-
formation, there is often no ex-ante stage or an explicit information structure in which
players observe values of some signals. In the modelling stage, each player i has the
following hierarchical belief system:
• Some belief τ1i ∈ ∆(Θ), about the payoffs (and the other aspects of the physical
world), a belief that is often referred to as the first order belief of i
• Some belief τ2i ∈ ∆(Θ × ∆(ΘΘ)) about the payoffs and the other players’ first
order beliefs ((θ, τ1−i))
• Iteratively, for each n, some belief τni about the payoffs and the other players’
beliefs of all orders < n, ((θ, τ1−i, τ
2
−i, . . . τ
n−1
−i ))
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In the Harsanyi type space formalism [21–23], the infinite belief hierarchies are modelled
using a type space (Θ, T, P ) and also using a type ti ∈ Ti in the following way: Given
a type ti and a type space (Θ, T, P ), one can compute the first order belief of a type
ti, by
h1i (· | ti) = margθp(· | ti) (26)
so that
h1i (θ | ti) =
∑
t−i
margθp(θ, t−i | ti) (27)
and the second order by
h2i (θ, hˆ
1
−i) =
∑
t−i|h1−i(·|t−i=hˆ
1
−i
p(θ, t−i | ti) (28)
A type space (Θ, t, p), and a type ti ∈ Ti model a belief hierarchy (τ
1
i , τ
2
i , ...) if
hki (· | ti = τ
k
i ), ∀ k (29)
Given any Bayesian game (N,A,Θ, u, π), with common prior π, one can define the
ex-ante game, which we denote by Gex = (N,S,U), where Si = A
Ti
i and
Ui = Eπ[ui(θ, s(t)] (30)
for each i ∈ N and s ∈ S. For any Bayesian game (N,A,Θ, T, u, p) one can also define
the interim game, which we denote by Gint = (Nˆ , Sˆ, Uˆ), where Nˆ = ∪i∈Ti and also
Sˆti = Ai for each ti ∈ Nˆ and
Uti(sˆ) = E[ui(θ, sˆt−i | pi(· | ti)] =
∑
(θ,t−i)
ui(θ, sˆt−i)p(θ, t−i | ti) (31)
for each i ∈ N and s ∈ S.
3.1 Ex-ante game and Ex-ante Rationalizability
Given any Bayesian game (N,A,Θ, T, u, p) and a player i ∈ N , a strategy si : Ti → Ai
is said to be ex-ante rationalizable iff si is rationalizable in the corresponding ex-ante
strategic form game Gant [5, 6, 36]. Ex-ante rationalizability makes sense if there is an
ex-ante stage in the game. In that case, ex-ante rationalizability captures precisely the
implications of common knowledge of rationality as perceived in the ex-ante planning
stage of the game [5,6]. It does impose unnecessary restrictions on players’ beliefs from
an interim perspective however. Let us look at the following example [5,6,36]: Consider
a Bayesian game with the following characteristics:
• N = (1, 2))
• Θ = (θ, θ′)
• T = (t1, t
′
1)× t2
• p(θ, t1, t2) = p(θ
′, t′1, t2) =
1
2
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The action space and the payoff functions are given by
θ L R
U 1,ǫ -2,0
D 0,0 0,1
,
θ′ L R
U -2,ǫ 1,0
D 0,0 5,1
Here, player A has two types corresponding to two different payoff actions. Player B
has only one payoff table and one type. The ex-ante representation of this game is
equal to
L R
UU −1/2,ǫ −1/2,ǫ
UD 1/2,ǫ −1,1/2
DU −1,ǫ/2 1/2,1/2
DD 0,0 0,1
To every Bayesian game corresponds an ex-ante perfect information strategic form
game. The actions that are rationalizable in the ex-ante strategic form game are called
ex-ante rationalizable actions. The rationalizable strategy profile in the case at hand
is S∞(Gant = (DU,R)). The periodicity cycle of this strategy is
DU
P
−→ R
P
−→ DU (32)
In addition, we can see that the theorem which relates types to periodicity number
holds true, since there are two types needed to describes this periodic cycles. In this
case, the types are the ones that correspond to the perfect information ex-ante strategic
form game, so these are seen in a perfect information perspective. Of course all the
theorems holding true for finite simultaneous strategic form games, hold also true for
Bayesian games since the latter are equivalent to perfect information strategic form
games. We now proceed to interim rationalizability related periodic equilibria.
3.2 Interim Rationalizability
There are conflicting notions of interim rationalizability in incomplete information
games in the literature. One straightforward notion of interim rationalizability is to ap-
ply rationalizability to the interim game Gint. An embedded assumption of the interim
game is that it is common knowledge that the belief of a player i about θ−i, which is
given by pi(· | ti), is independent of his belief about the other players’ actions. In par-
ticular, his belief about (θ, t−i, ai) is derived from some belief pi(· | ti)×µti for some µti
∈ ∆(A
T−i
−i ). This is because we have taken the expectations with respect to pi(· | ti), in
defining the interim game Gint, before considering his beliefs about the other players’
actions. Because of this independence assumption, such a rationalizability notion is
called interim independent rationalizability. Through the interim rationalizability we
will make contact with the periodicity concept in this case as well.
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3.2.1 Interim Independent Rationalizability
Given any Bayesian game B = (N,A,Θ, T, u, p) and any type ti of player i ∈ N , an
action ai ∈ Ai is said to be interim independent rationalizable for ti, iff ai is rational-
izable for ti in the interim game Gint. The interim independent Rationalizability is the
most complex type of rationalizability among all the rationalizability types for Bayesian
games. Consider the Bayesian game we used in the previous example of the ex-ante
game. The corresponding interim independent game is actually a 3-player game with
player-type set N = (t1, t
′
1, t2), and with the following payoff table:
U1
θ L R
U 1,ǫ,-2 -2,0,1
D 0,ǫ/2,-2 0,1/2,1
, D1
θ′ L R
U 1,ǫ/2,0 -2,1/2,0
D 0,0,0 0,1,0
The first player t1 chooses the rows, the player t2 the columns and finally type t
′
1
chooses the matrices. All actions are rationalizable as can be easily checked. Let us
see the periodicity graphs for the above game. For instance for U , the corresponding
periodicity graph appears in Fig. 7.
This example is somewhat degenerate, but the periodicity study is identical to the study
of periodicity in a 3-player strategic form game. This also proves that indirectly, using
the interim rationalizability strategies, we relate the non-perfect information game to a
multi-player, perfect information, simultaneous, strategic form game and therefore all
the periodicity theorems hold true in this case as well . We further proceed in the same
fashion and relate periodicity to the Interim Correlated Rationalizability concept.
BayesianPeriodic
Interim Independent Rationalizability
(L,U )1U
(R,D )1
(R,U)U1
L
Figure 7: Periodicity for a 3-player Bayesian Game. The first player with type t1
chooses the rows with actions U and D, the second player with type t2 the columns,
with actions L and R and finally the third player with type t′1 chooses the two matrices
of the game.
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3.2.2 Interim Correlated Rationalizability
Consider a Bayesian game B = (N,A,Θ, T, u, p). Interim correlated rationalizabil-
ity [5, 6] allows more beliefs than interim independent rationalizability, and it is a
weaker concept in reference to the latter. When all types have positive probability,
ex ante rationalizability is stronger than the other two interim rationalizabilities. So
all ex-ante rationalizable actions are interim independent and all interim independent
rationalizable actions are interim correlated rationalizable actions. The converse is not
true. Thus the following holds true [5, 6]:
ex− ante ⊂ Interim − independent ⊂ interim− correlated (33)
Interim correlated rationalizability captures the implications of common knowledge of
rationality precisely [5, 6]. In addition, interim independent rationalizability depends
on the way the hierarchies are modelled, in that there can be multiple representations
of the same hierarchy, with distinct sets of interim independent rationalizable actions.
Moreover, one cannot have any extra robust prediction from refining interim correlated
rationalizability. Any prediction that does not follow from interim correlated ratio-
nalizability alone relies on the assumptions about the infinite hierarchy of beliefs. A
researcher cannot verify such a prediction in the modelling stage without the knowledge
of the infinite hierarchy of beliefs. Now, the interim correlated rationalizable actions
are the ones that are rationalizable in the interim correlated game. Let us see how this
game is found, by using a Bayesian game [5, 6]. Take Θ = (−1, 1), N = (1, 2) and the
payoff matrices are:
θ = 1 b1 b2 b3
a1 1,1 -10,10 -10,0
a2 -10,-10 1,1 -10,0
a3 0,-10 0,-10 0,0
,
θ = −1 b1 b2 b3
a1 -10,-10 1,1 -10,0
a2 1,1 -10,-10 -10,0
a3 0,-10 0,-10 0,0
Table 1: Game 1B
We consider the type space T = (t1, t2), with p(θ = 1, t) = p(θ = −1, t) = 1/2. The
interim game is the following complete information game:
θ = 1 b1 b2 b3
a1 −9/2,−9/2 −9/2,−9/2 -10,0
a2 −9/2,−9/2 −9/2,−9/2 -10,0
a3 0,-10 0,-10 0,0
Table 2: Game 1B
It is easy to show that even in this Bayesian framework we can find a periodic action and
specifically in the interim reduced game. Thereby, we indirectly demonstrated that by
using the various imperfect information rationalizability concepts, we relate periodicity
with Bayesian games in general. Therefore we may formalize the periodicity concept
in Bayesian games.
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3.2.3 Periodicity and Bayesian Games
We can easily understand that since every Bayesian game corresponds to some perfect
information, finite player, finite action, strategic form game, the following theorem
holds.
Theorem 3. Every finite action simultaneous N -player Bayesian strategic form game
contains at least one periodic action.
Proof. Every finite player finite action strategic form game corresponds to an interim
game or an ex-ante game, which are finite action finite player games. Therefore since
every finite action, finite player strategic form game has at least a periodic action, it
follows that this is also true for every finite action, finite player, Bayesian strategic form
game.
Moreover, all the arguments that hold for perfect information games also hold for the
ex-ante and interim representations of a strategic form game. So we can generalize these
arguments to Bayesian games. For the ex-ante and interim correlated representations
of a Bayesian game, the following theorem holds.
Theorem 4. In a two player perfect information ex-ante and interim correlated rep-
resentation of a two-player Bayesian strategic form game, the number of types Nti
corresponding to the periodic cycle of an ex-ante or interim correlated rationalizable
periodic action is
Nti = 2n (34)
The types are those corresponding to the perfect information representation of the
Bayesian game and not those corresponding to the incomplete information game.
Proof. We shall call rationalizable strategies those which are rationalizable for the cor-
responding ex-ante or interim correlated strategic form game, without specifying to
which we refer [5, 6]. The results hold for either case. Having this in mind, for every
such action, if the periodicity number is n, it is possible to construct a periodic chain
with exactly 2n rationalizable actions appearing in that chain. Therefore, we need to
prove that for each action appearing in the rationalizability chain there exists at least
one type, so the minimum number of types corresponding to all the actions of the
rationalizability chain is 2n. As is proved in [36], in a static game with finitely many
choices for every player, it is always possible to construct an epistemic model in which,
• Every type expresses common belief in rationality
• Every type assigns for every opponent probability 1 to one specific choice and one
specific type for that opponent.
Thus, for two player games, each type for player A, for example, assigns probability 1 to
one of his opponent’s actions and one specific type for that action, such that this action
is optimal for his opponent. In addition, in two player games, rationalizable actions
and choices that can be made under common belief in rationality coincide. Hence,
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we can associate to every rationalizable action of player A exactly one type which in
turn assigns probability 1 to one specific rationalizable action and one specific type of
his opponents type’s and actions. Moreover, as proved in [36], the actions that can
rationally be made under common belief in rationality are rationalizable. To state this
more formally, in a static game with finitely many actions for every player, the choices
that can rationally be made under common belief in rationality, are exactly those choices
that survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Hence, for two player
games, we conclude that strategies which express common belief in rationality and
rationalizable strategies coincide. This is because all beliefs in two-player games are
independent. (This is not always true in games with more than two players, however.)
Therefore, when periodic rationalizable strategies are considered, the total number of
types needed for a rationalizability cycle is equal to 2n. This concludes the proof.
4 Periodicity and Cooperativity
While our concept of a periodic solution seems to involve some form of cooperativity,
this is of course different from what is called cooperative game theory. The latter
is about binding commitments, coalitions and the distribution of payoffs inside such
coalitions. All these features are absent in our setting. For further illustration, we
shall now discuss one of the most refined cooperative game theory concepts, that of
a cooperative-competitive (CO-CO) solution [39] (see also [40]) and we shall compare
the results of this solution concept with those that result from the periodic strategies
algorithm.
4.1 Cooperative-Competitive Equilibrium
Consider a general, two player non-zero sum game with players A and B, described by
the payoff functions ΦA and ΦB , with:
ΦA :M(A)×M(B)→ ℜ, Φb :M(A)×M(B)→ ℜ (35)
with the strategy spacesM(A) andM(B) being compact metric spaces, and the payoff
functions being continuous functions from M(A)×M(B) into ℜ. If cooperativity and
communication between players is allowed, the players A and B can adopt a set of
strategies (a♯, b♯) that maximizes their combined payoffs,
V ♯ = ΦA(a♯, b♯) + ΦB(a♯, b♯) = maxa,b∈M(A)×M(B)
[
ΦA(a, b) + ΦB(a, b)
]
(36)
The choice of the strategy (a♯, b♯) may favor one player more than the other. In such
a case, the player that is better off must provide some incentive to the other player,
in order that he complies with the strategy (a♯, b♯). This incentive is actually a side
payment. Splitting the total payoff, V ♯ into two equal parts will not be acceptable,
because this does not reflect the relative strength of the players and their personal
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contributions to their cooperativity outcomes [40]. A more realistic approach was
introduced by [39] which we shall now describe. Define the following game:
Φ♯(a, b) =
ΦA(a, b) + ΦB(a, b)
2
, ΦS(a, b) =
ΦA(a, b)− ΦB(a, b)
2
(37)
These relations actually imply that the original game is split into two games, a purely
cooperative one, with payoff Φ♯(a, b), and a competitive one (which is a zero sum
game), with payoff ΦS(a, b). In the cooperative game, the players have equal payoffs,
that is, they both receive Φ♯(a, b), while in the purely competitive part, the players
have opposite payoffs, namely ΦS(a, b) and −ΦS(a, b).
Denote the value of the zero-sum game by V S , with utility function ΦS(a, b).
Having found the value of the game, the cooperative-competitive value of the game is
defined as the payoff pair
(
V ♯
2
+ V S ,
V ♯
2
− V S) (38)
The cooperative-competitive solution of the game is defined as the pair of strategies
(a♯, b♯), together with a side payment PS from player B to player A, such that:
ΦA(a♯, b♯) + PS =
V ♯
2
+ V S (39)
ΦB(a♯, b♯)− PS =
V ♯
2
− V S
Obviously, the side payment can be negative, in which case player A pays player B the
amount PS .
Conceptually, the cooperative-competitive solution is opposite to the algorithm that
yields periodic strategies, owing to the fact that the cooperative-competitive solution,
namely the strategy pair (a♯, b♯), is determined by maximizing the sum of the player’s
and his opponent’s utility. The periodic strategies on the other hand are computed by
maximizing each player’s own payoff, with respect to the opponent’s actions. We shall
now present some characteristic examples and compare the cooperative-competitive
solution and the periodic algorithm solution.
4.2 Cooperative-Competitive Solution and Periodicity Algorithm–Some
Examples
Consider the Battle of Sexes game that appears in Table 3.
b1 b2
a1 2,1 0,0
a2 0,0 1,2
Table 3: Battle of Sexes
As we demonstrated in Ref. [3], for this game both the pure strategy pairs (a1, b1)
and (a2, b2) are periodic strategies. Moreover, when we apply the periodic strategies
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algorithm to mixed strategies, we obtain a mixed strategy that yields the same payoffs
as the mixed Nash equilibrium, with the difference that each player’s payoff does not
depend on his opponent’s actions. Let us recall the results:
The mixed Nash equilibrium for this game is (p∗N =
2
3 , q
∗
N =
1
3) and moreover, the
application of the periodic strategies algorithm yields the strategy, (p∗p = 1/3, q
∗
p = 2/3).
The expected utilities of the players are:
U1p,q(p
∗
p = 1/3, q) =
2
3
, (40)
U2p,q(p, q
∗
p = 2/3) =
2
3
,
U1p,q(p, q
∗
N = 1/3) =
2
3
,
U1p,q(p
∗
N = 2/3, q) =
2
3
Hence, the payoff corresponding to the mixed Nash equilibrium is (U1N ,U2N ) = (2/3, 2/3)
and the algorithm of periodic strategies yields the payoffs (U1P ,U2P ) = (2/3, 2/3). Let
us now turn to the cooperative-competitive solution of the Battle of Sexes game. By
the procedure described in the previous subsection, the zero-sum game of the Battle of
Sexes game is given in table 4.
b1 b2
a1 1/2 0
a2 0 -1/2
Table 4: Battle of Sexes
We compute V ♯ = 3 and V S = 0. It is obvious that the cooperative-competitive
strategy is constituted from any of the two strategy sets (a1, b1) or (a2, b2). Within the
cooperative-competitive solution, player B must make a side payment PS = 1 to player
A. Hence, in the cooperative-competitive solution the final utilities are (U1CC ,U2CC) =
(2, 2). As we can see, when players cooperate, they receive a higher payoff than in all
other non-cooperative payoffs we presented for this game. Consequently, the strategies
that are obtained from the periodic strategies algorithm are, in expected utility terms,
as non-cooperative as the mixed Nash equilibrium.
Let us give another example of the non-cooperativity of the mixed and non-mixed
periodic strategies. Consider the game that appears in Table 5.
The payoffs corresponding to the mixed Nash equilibrium (p∗N =
5
6 , q
∗
N =
48
49) and the
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b1 b2 b3 b4
a1 0,7 2,5 7,0 0,1
a2 5,2 7,7 5,2 0,1
a3 7,0 2,5 0,7 0,1
a4 0,0 0,-2 0,0 10,-1
Table 5: Game 1B
ones corresponding to the periodic strategies algorithm (p∗p = 1/49, q
∗
p =
48
49 ) are
U1P (p
∗
p = 1/49, q) =
146
49
(41)
U2P (p, q
∗
p = 1/6) =
35
6
U1N (p, q
∗
N = 48/49) =
146
49
U1N (p
∗
N = 5/6, q) =
35
6
The strategy (a1, b2) corresponds to the cooperative-competitive strategy. The values
V ♯ and V S are equal to V ♯ = 56 and V S = −32 , and hence the side payment of player
A to player B is PS = −
47
2 . The cooperative-competitive value of the game (the final
payoffs of the two players) is (U1CC ,U2CC) = (
53
2 ,
59
2 ). By comparing the cooperative
payoffs with the non-cooperative ones, appearing in equation (41), it is obvious that
the non-cooperative ones are smaller than the cooperative ones. Thus, the strategies
that result from applying the periodic strategies algorithm are again non-cooperative.
Nevertheless, for some games, the cooperative-competitive strategies payoff value (in
the terminology of cooperative-competitive equilibria) may coincide with the periodic
mixed or pure strategies payoff. But this occurs only for a rather particular class of
games, like the Prisoner-Dilemma. For example, for the game in Table 4.2,
B1 B2
A1 4,4 -1,6
A2 6,-1 0,0
Table 6: Prisoners Dilemma
the application of the periodic strategies results to the strategy pair (A1, B1), with
payoffs (U1P ,U2P ) = (4, 4). For this game the values V
♯ and V S are equal to V ♯ = 8
and V S = 0, and the side payment of player A to player B is PS = 0. Consequently,
the cooperative-competitive value of the game is (U1CC ,U2CC) = (4, 4), which is the
same as the periodic one. However, this is accidental and an artifact of the details of
the payoff matrix.
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5 Epistemic Game Theory Framework and Periodic Strate-
gies
In this section, we shall connect the periodicity number n appearing in the automor-
phism Qn defined earlier to the number of types needed to describe a two player simul-
taneous strategic form game within an epistemic framework. We shall assume a perfect
information context. The epistemic game theory formalism was introduced by Harsanyi,
in order to describe incomplete information games [21–23] and thereafter adopted by
other authors (see for example [4–6] and references therein). Our approach mimics the
one used in [24] and also the one adopted from Perea in [36]. For completeness, we
shall briefly present the appropriate formalism and reasoning.
5.1 Belief Hierarchies in Complete Information Games and Types and
Common Belief in Rationality
Consider a two player game with a set of finite actions for each player, A and B. A
belief hierarchy for player A of the game is constructed from a chain of increasing order
beliefs in terms of objective probabilities as follows [36]:
• A first order belief is the belief that player A holds for player B’s actions
• Iteratively, a k−th order belief represents the belief that player A holds for the
(k − 1)-th order belief of player B.
The belief hierarchy expresses in general rational choices of the players under common
belief in rationality, that is, every player believes in his opponent’s rationality and
believes that his opponent believes that he acts rationally and so on. Since belief
hierarchies are not so easy to use in practice, the concept of a type is introduced, which
encompasses all the information that a belief hierarchy contains, but is a more compact
way to describe such a hierarchy.
Before doing that, let us quantify the belief hierarchies in a more formal way, in terms
of spaces of probability distributions. With a suitable topology and metric, the space
of probability distributions on a compact metric space is again a compact metric space,
and therefore, the construction can be iterated, that is, we can consider probability
distributions on spaces of probability distributions.
The first order belief hierarchy is given by all the probabilities distributions over the
space of actions that player i considers possible for his opponents. By assumption, this
set X1i is finite, hence in particular compact, and we may also equip it with a metric.
The space of first order beliefs then is the space of probability distributions on that
space,
B1i = ∆(X
1
i ) (42)
Iteratively, we obtain the k-th order of uncertainty,
Xki = X
k−1
i × (×j 6=iB
k−1
j ) (43)
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which embodies the (k− 1)-th order space of uncertainty and also the (k− 1)-th order
of the opponent’s beliefs. Thus, the space of k-th order beliefs is the set ∆(Xki ). A
belief hierarchy bi for the player i is an infinite chain of beliefs b
k
i ∈ B
k
i , ∀ k, that is:
bi = (b
1
i , b
2
i , ..., b
k
i ) (44)
Relation (44) encodes what was said above. The belief hierarchy is assumed to be
coherent, which means that the various beliefs in the belief hierarchy do not contradict
each other, that is, for m > k
mrg(bmi |X
k−1
i ) = b
k−1
i (45)
Having defined coherent belief hierarchies, the epistemic framework is constructed using
the definition of an epistemic type which is simply a coherent belief hierarchy for a player
i. A type corresponds to some epistemic model constructed for the game, so let Ti be
the total number of types needed to describe player i. In addition, for every player i
and for every ti ∈ Ti, the epistemic model specifies a probability distribution bi(ti) over
the set C−i × T−i, which represents the set of choice-types of player i’s opponent −i.
The probability distribution bi(ti) stands for the belief that a player i’s type ti holds
about player’s −i actions and types, so
bi : Ti → ∆(T−i × C−i) (46)
for a two player game. The type of a player i is the complete belief hierarchy. Now a
choice ci of player i is optimal for his type ti if it is optimal for the first order beliefs that
ti holds about the opponent’s choices. Within the epistemic game theoretic framework,
one can easily define common belief in rationality. Indeed, we say that the type ti
believes in the opponent’s rationality if ti assigns positive probability to his opponents
−i choice types (c−i, t−i), in which case c−i is optimal for type t−i. Having defined the
belief in opponent’s rationality, we define the k−fold belief in rationality [36]:
• Type ti expresses 1-fold belief in rationality if ti believes in the opponent’s ratio-
nality
• Iteratively, type ti expresses k-fold belief in rationality if ti assigns positive prob-
ability to opponent types that express (k − 1)-fold belief in rationality.
• Type ti corresponding to player i expresses common belief in rationality, if it
expresses k−fold belief in rationality for every k.
In addition, we can formally define a rational choice, when common belief in rationality
is assumed in the game, as follows: A choice ci of player i is rational under common
belief in rationality, if there is some type ti such that:
• Type ti, expresses common belief in rationality
• Choice ci is optimal for this type ti
Our aim is to connect the periodicity number n defined earlier to the number of types
that are necessary to describe a simultaneous two player finite action game. This
connection will use the point rationalizable strategies.
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5.2 The Connection of the Periodicity Number to the total Number
of Types of the Epistemic Model
As demonstrated in Ref. [3] the rationalizable actions that are also periodic are partic-
ularly interesting, since for these we can connect the total periodicity number n to the
numbers of types needed to describe the game with an epistemic model. This relation
can be described by the following theorem:
Theorem 5. In a two player perfect information strategic form game, the number of
types Nti corresponding to the periodic cycle of a rationalizable periodic action is
Nti = 2n (47)
Proof. For every such action if the periodicity number is n, it is possible to construct a
periodicity chain with exactly 2n rationalizable actions appearing in that chain. There-
fore what is necessary to prove is that for each action appearing in the rationalizability
chain, there exist at least one type, so the minimum number of types corresponding
to all the actions of the rationalizability chain is 2n. As proved in [36], in a static
game with finitely many choices for every player, it is always possible to construct an
epistemic model in which,
• Every type expresses common belief in rationality
• Every type assigns for every opponent probability 1 to one specific choice and one
specific type for that opponent.
Therefore, for two player games, each type for player A for example, assigns probability
1 to one of his opponents actions and one specific type for that action, such that this
action is optimal for his opponent. In addition, in two player games, rationalizable
actions and choices that can be made under common belief in rationality coincide.
Hence, we can associate to every rationalizable action of player A exactly one type
which in turn assigns probability 1 to one specific rationalizable action and one specific
type of his opponent’s types and actions. Moreover, as proved in [36], the actions that
can rationally be made under common belief in rationality are rationalizable. To state
this more formally, in a static game with finitely many actions for every player, the
choices that can rationally be made under common belief in rationality are exactly
those that survive iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Hence, for two
player games, we conclude that strategies which express common belief in rationality
and rationalizable strategies coincide. This is because all beliefs in two-player games are
independent, something that is not always true in games with more than two players.
Therefore, when periodic rationalizable strategies are considered, the total number of
types needed for a rationalizability cycle is equal to 2n.
5.2.1 A Comment on Simple Belief Hierarchies and Nash Equilibria
Within an epistemic game theory context, a type ti is said to have a simple belief
hierarchy, if ti’s belief hierarchy is generated by some combination σi of probabilistic
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beliefs about the players choices. Thus, a type has a simple belief hierarchy if it is
believed that his opponents are correct about his beliefs. As proved in [36], a simple
belief hierarchy, given by probabilistic beliefs σi about players’ choices, expresses com-
mon belief in rationality, if the combination σi of beliefs is itself a Nash equilibrium.
The converse is not always true. Hence, using the theorem above, the number of types
needed to describe a simple belief hierarchy for a Nash equilibrium is 2. Obviously, if a
Nash action is periodic, then n = 1 and applying relation (47), we find that the types
needed in the periodic Nash case are two.
There is an interesting point regarding simple belief hierarchies. When considering
two player games, it is proved (see [36], theorem 4.4.3) that a type ti has a simple
belief hierarchy iff ti believes that his opponent holds correct beliefs and believes that
his opponent believes that he holds correct beliefs himself. Thus, he believes that he
does not err in his prediction about his opponent’s beliefs, and he believes that for his
opponent too. In higher order beliefs this is no longer true, and therefore we could
argue that the total number of wrong beliefs of all the two players about each other’s
beliefs is equal to 2n− 1. Thus, the total number of errors of the two players is 2n− 1.
Errors here are the beliefs σi due to which the higher order belief hierarchy fails to be
a simple belief hierarchy.
Concluding Remarks
In this work we have studied extensions and generalizations of the periodicity concept
introduced in [3]. In particular, we have shown the existence of periodic strategies in
multi-player perfect information simultaneous strategic form games. We also proved
that the set of periodic strategies is set-stable under the periodicity map. In addition,
we discussed the presence of periodic strategies in games with incomplete information,
focusing on Bayesian games. In that case we made extensive use of various generaliza-
tions of Bernheim’s rationalizability concept. The issue of cooperativity and periodicity
was formally addressed as well. The periodic strategies are simply as cooperative as
the mixed Nash equilibrium. In an epistemic framework, the number of types needed
to describe the rationalizability cycle of a rationalizable periodic strategy equals twice
the periodicity number of that action. The next step would be the inclusion of mixed
strategies in multi-player games. Actually, the cooperativity issue in games with more
than two players becomes more complex, because the players are free to form coalitions.
Periodicity then has to be reconsidered under this perspective.
Clearly, the periodicity feature for finitely many actions of strategic form games can be
very useful. Indeed, all the periodic actions can be found using some simple program.
This result is actually a common feature of every non-degenerate finite action game,
that is, every non-Nash rationalizable action is usually periodic. This can be very use-
ful for games that have, as we mentioned, finitely many actions, since the potential
non-Nash rationalizable actions can be determined by finding the periodic strategies.
Furthermore, an interesting future study would be to consider 3-player mixed strategies
and their relation to periodic strategies. One should carefully examine whether there is
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any exceptional class of games with the special attributes of the two player games that
we presented in the present article. In particular, we should check whether the algo-
rithm of periodic strategies leads to strategies for which the expected utility of players
is higher than the corresponding Nash one, and in addition if the periodic strategies
for a player are independent of the other player’s action, as in the two player case. In
addition, the multi-player cooperativity issue should also be formally addressed. The
question whether the periodic strategies imply any sort of cooperativity has to be re-
addressed in a multi-player context. This is because, in cases with N ≥ 3 players,
two or more players may form coalitions in order to cooperate against the rest. More-
over, one can investigate the case of continuum utility functions. Finally, in the case
of Bayesian games, one might look for a connection between the types of the imper-
fect information case and the corresponding Ex-ante or interim game, or a connection
between periodicity imperfect information types spaces.
An important feature of periodic strategies as examined in this paper is that they make
a player robust against the way that the opponent-rival decides to play the game. In
contrast to the Nash strategies, where each player relies on his opponent’s rationality
and on the fact that the opponent will actually play the Nash strategy too, the pay-
off of a player that uses a periodic strategy is not affected by the opponent’s actual
actions. This is valuable in non-trivial games, like the prisoner’s dilemma. It is re-
markable that although we used a non-trivial non-cooperative context, we ended up
that the optimal equilibrium of the game is the socially optimal solution. In this work
we demonstrated how periodic strategies can be realized in multi-player simultaneous
perfect information games and also in games with imperfect information. Hence this
shows that the periodicity concept seems to be an inherent feature of every non-trivial
game. The advantage of the periodic strategies over the Nash strategies is that the
periodic strategies players do not depend on the rationality of the opponent. Although
rationality is considered a prerequisite in most games, there exist many modern politics
and economics related examples where rationality is questioned. More importantly, in
many cases the opponents may have hidden information, so although a player might
think that the payoff are given and the game is played with perfect information about
the payoffs of the game, the opponent might act non-rationally with respect to the
perfect information game, but rationally with respect to the hidden information game.
the periodic strategies then are safe strategies in the sense that the possibility of loosing
is minimized or controlled in a formal way.
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